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These are serious political statements, and they need to be interpreted as such. They signal the intimate, and increasingly ideologically charged, connection between gender, marriage, and kingship in sixteenth- 5 John Knox's History, 2:7. The dismay experienced by English councillors at Mary's impending return is clearly conveyed by the proposal, seriously debated at the highest levels, that Mary should either not be allowed to leave France or be intercepted and diverted to a destination sufficiently inhospitable to make her arrival on Scottish soil unlikely. Ireland was mentioned as a possibility, as was the west of Scotland, home of the next in line to the Scottish throne, the Hamiltons. See Calendar of State Papers, Foreign, Elizabeth, 1558-89 (hereafter cited as CSP Foreign), 4:203-5; and R. K. Hannay, ''The Earl of Arran and Queen Mary,'' Scottish Historical Review 18 (1921): 267. 6 He may have hoped that one of the two queens-presumably Elizabeth-would, with God's grace, prove to be sufficiently virtuous to become a man. Contemporary Galenic theory held that women could turn into men if they began to generate sufficient heat to expel their genitals from their bodies, thereby overcoming the imperfection visited upon them in utero that relegated them to female identity. See century Britain. In this article, I want to consider the linkages between marriage and kingship as contemporaries understood them, in the circumstances of queenship and reformation in which they found themselves. I then want to explore their implications for Elizabethan politics. During the early modern period, when nations were conceived of as bodies politic, when monarchs were credited with two bodies in order to compensate for the deficiencies of their natural selves, marriage assumed important ideological as well as dynastic significance.
8 It featured as a powerful analogy for relations between monarchs and their realms, modeling how two distinct corporations, king and commonwealth, could enact a unitary identity after the example of Christ and his church. It was a model predicated on the assumption that the head would be male. J. H. Burns has shown how the scholastic debate over monarchy of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries elevated the status of the monarch, whether pope or emperor, by reference to his reception of authority from, and hence identity with, Christ, the supreme head: ''him by whom kings reign. '' 9 Increasingly, after the Reformation, that elevation served to legitimate the claims to empire of territorial and national monarchs. It also served to more overtly inscribe the marriage model as patriarchal, at the level of the crown and within the family. 10 At first sight paradoxically, in view of Erasmian and Protestant idealizations of Christian marriage as a partnership between spiritual equals, the pressure to secure God-ordained order in a fractured European corpus mysticum advanced conceptions of marriage that insisted on male superiority. By the early seventeenth 8 century, they also promoted ''absolutist'' conceptions of kingly authority.
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The linkage between marriage and specifically kingly identity was therefore uniquely tight during this period, when, for contemporaries, so much hinged on the promise of religious reformation. The same pressure also, and by the same token, challenged traditional norms of dynastic inheritance and succession. Throughout Europe, Protestant reformation in particular was associated with the drive to enthrone godly kings and disallow female rule. 12 In England, this compound was apparent from the point when Henry VIII divorced England from Rome and proclaimed an imperial destiny. 13 The subsequent career of the True Church in England and Scotland ensured that the desire for a king actually increased in intensity during Elizabeth's reign, as committed Protestant men confronted the interrelated problems of female rule, resurgent Catholicism in Europe, and the seeming inevitability of a female Catholic successor, Mary Queen of Scots, to the last of Henry VIII's direct heirs. The king envisioned by what Patrick Collinson has called the ''Protestant ascendancy''-that powerful band of brothers in Christ who dominated AngloScottish politics during the first decades of Elizabeth's reign-would be a godly male monarch, ruling in tandem with his godly male councillors to promote the welfare of the whole isle, England and Scotland.
14 He would be a warrior in God's cause, uniting virtue and virility in his person and fighting to secure the True Church in Europe. Marriage repre-11 J. H. Burns, ''The Idea of Absolutism,'' in Absolutism in Seventeenth Century Europe, ed. John Miller (London, 1990), pp. 21-42. R. W. K. Hinton refers to the ''plunge into analogy'' that was so marked a feature of political debate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: ''As the father loved his son, the son honoured and obeyed his father, so kings and commonwealths were to be understood as comprising a single family. ' sented a powerful tool that could turn these apocalyptically tinged dreams into reality. With God's sustaining hand, it could secure a Protestant male succession for a British empire forged in grace.
Yet, from the very beginning, there were crucial ambiguities about the terms of this engagement. Was this outcome to be achieved immediately, in the person of the queen's consort, or through a (male) heir, product of their union?
15 If the former, was nationality immaterial? How strong was the fraternal bond between the Scots and the English?
16 How far outside the realm could one go, could marriages be contracted, before even Protestant brothers turned into ''strangers''? A more troubling question arose: marriage to which queen-Elizabeth, or her cousin Mary? 17 And what if marriage did not achieve this end? What if one or both queens proved to be loose cannons, in terms of their spousal choices or their determination not to marry at all? These ambiguities lay at the heart of Elizabethan politics. Over the course of Elizabeth's reign, failure to resolve them forced men to innovate in an attempt to secure godly male rule. Their response was to privilege Protestant virility in relation to royal blood, hence law and election in relation to established patterns of inheritance and descent. This recalibration also allowed for some elasticity in the definition of a ''king''-some crucial room for maneuver in a situation complicated by the fact that kings who met Protestant selection criteria were, as Knox complained, ''hard to find. '' 18 It was a radical but not impossible step in a lineage society that featured a high degree of intermarriage among a numerically restricted elite defined, by blood entitlement, as peers of the realm. The consequences for subsequent British history were momentous. The attempt to conjure up a king in the context 15 For English willingness to accept the queen's consort as king in his own right, see Glyn Redworth, '' 'Matters Impertinent to Women': Male and Female Monarchy under Philip and Mary,'' English Historical Review 112, no. 447 (1997): 597-613. 16 For a persuasive analysis of the fraternal bond and its significance in political thought, see Carol Pateman, ''The Fraternal Social Contract,'' in her The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 33-57. 17 Modern historians have gone badly wrong in assuming that the contemporaries understood or accepted the dichotomy between the two queens that we take for granted. Sir John Harington speaks to the insecurities that their inability to effectively differentiate caused, noting that right up until Mary's execution in 1587, ''if one prayed for the Queen, even at his last breath, when there was no dissembling with God nor with the world, yet even then some would ask him, which Queen?' ' of ''two queens in one isle'' inaugurated what proved to be a conclusive move away from belief in kingship as embodied essence to its abstract conceptualization as an office of state: one that was, in the last resort, divorceable from both the blood and the person of the king.
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Historians of Elizabeth's reign have largely ignored or misunderstood this ideological dimension, however, at the cost of an informed understanding of the political dynamics of the Elizabethan polity. Susan Doran has charted Elizabeth's numerous marriage negotiations in an attempt to shed new light on why Elizabeth did not marry. She takes issue with what she regards as the feminist-inspired orthodoxy voiced by Joel Hurstfield and Christopher Haigh: that Elizabeth refused to marry because she could not bear to be a ''mere wife,'' especially since that status would compromise her authority and power to rule. Doran concludes that she did not marry because her Privy Council could not agree on a bridegroom. Her reading presents us with the unconvincing image of a queen ready to marry, patiently waiting year after year for the all clear from a Privy Council almost farcically unable to cooperate on this allimportant matter despite the high stakes. ''Perhaps they were distracted,'' she suggests, ''bemused by the variety and number of Elizabeth's suitors.'' Perhaps their determination to consolidate their own positions, early in the reign, fatally undermined any incentive to present their queen with a husband: the first, essential step toward establishing a Protestant succession. 20 More recently, Stephen Alford has investigated the politics of succession in the years 1558 to 1569 from an Anglo-Scottish perspective. His account usefully highlights the centrality of marriage, particularly in connection with the threat posed to the Protestant regime by the status of Mary Queen of Scots as heir-in-waiting to an emergent British empire. Yet, by positing a stark antithesis between what he terms ''dynastic'' and ''political'' terms of reference, he casts the Elizabethan polity in a Whiggish mold-with Elizabeth's chief councillor William Cecil in the role of a modernizing man of vision. For Alford, two choices were on offer during these years to secure British Protestantism and English These accounts are instructive. MacCaffrey is certainly right to identify the collective exercise of sovereignty as a key feature of Elizabeth's reign. They are finally unsatisfactory, however, because they do not adequately historicize the meaning of marriage and succession in its early modern cultural context. They ignore how tenuous, how provisional, was Elizabeth's hold on the crown, because of her sex, and how she and her councillors both used and altered dynastic terms of reference in order to forward their asymmetric goals: hers to retain unchallenged possession of the English crown during her lifetime; theirs to preserve Protestantism and English imperial identity in a realm that, kingless, was in important ways deemed to be acephalous. 23 From the moment when she was pro- 21 In fact his interpretation suggests that Elizabeth was little more than a cipher. Unity of the two realms was to be ''achieved through treaty, underwritten by the imperial power of the English Queen as a British monarch, bound together by Protestantism, and linked to a strong council and parliament in Scotland' '- claimed queen in 1558 until, at her death, the project to install James VI of Scotland as her successor in blood finally succeeded, English politics cannot be understood without foregrounding the determination of key elements of the political nation to acquire a Protestant king of Britain as a solution to the problem of female rule.
I want to make this case by investigating the politics of marriage and succession in the first two decades of Elizabeth's reign. Let me begin by providing a synoptic overview. We must first bring to center stage the realization that the men who dominated state affairs regarded themselves as being in a uniquely dangerous position during much of the reign because both rulers, not just the Catholic Mary of Scotland, were women. Marriage would counteract, if not obviate, some of the ''inconveniences'' attached to female rule, including, very importantly, women's assumed propensity to become tyrannical if not constrained in their exercise of political authority. 24 Subsumption of the two queens in the persons of godly Protestant husbands would nullify the effects of Mary's Catholicism-if it did not actually effect her conversion to Protestantism-and reinforce Elizabeth's commitment to the faith. Producing healthy male Protestant heirs was the concomitant of a godly marriage, as Henry VIII had asserted when attempting to legitimate the as-yet unborn children that he hoped God would grant him by Jane Seymour. If Elizabeth bore such heirs, this would annul Mary's immediate claim to the English throne; if Mary, and not Elizabeth, they would assure Scotland (and later England) of a Protestant succession. 25 Issue could also make Elizabeth's husband king in his own right, at least during his lifetime. The custom that confirmed the husband of a noble heiress in his possession of her dignity upon the birth of a child was applied to the crown in the mid-1550s, in Mary I's reign. 26 In the early years of Elizabeth's reign, then, marriage promised a solution to the problem posed by female rule. It offered a means by which Protestant rectitude and Tudor royal blood could be conjoined (through the marriage of either queen) and a king constituted, ambiguously through the marriage itself or through issue.
This understanding of marriage meant that Elizabeth's strongest card in her battle to remain an autonomous queen was her presumed fertility. This continued to be the case until the Anjou marriage negotiations of the late 1570s, when the combination of her age and her councillors' concerted anti-Anjou campaign terminally undermined it. 27 Only production of a male heir in the context of a Protestant marriage would satisfy the regime's ideological needs without overtly challenging existing patterns of blood inheritance and descent-without, in fact, directly challenging royal authority itself. This was an important consideration during revolutionary times. And Elizabeth's consent was necessary all along the line to achieve this desideratum, from accepting a potential suitor to acquiescing in his marital demands. ''Be after a sort a Christ unto us,'' pleaded one of her councillors in 1562. ''Mortify your own affections . . . and for our sakes, take the pains to bring forth princely children. '' 28 Her control of her own fertility meant that she could, paradoxically (and within limits), use the prospect of marriage to ensure that she never married-by finding fault with proposed suitors or by suggesting that she dearly loved and could only marry men deemed unsuitable, from Robert Dudley through to the French Catholic duc d'Anjou.
Elizabeth's ability to maneuver through playing the marriage card was always in tension with her councillors' determination to settle the succession. In 1566, William Cecil wrote a memorandum that signaled this divergence:
To urge both marriage and establishing of succession is the uttermost that can be desired. To deny both is the uttermost that can be denied. To require marriage is the most natural, most easy, most plausible to the Queen's Majesty. To require certainty of succession is the most plausible to all the people. To require succession is the hardest to be obtained both for the difficulty to discuss the right and for the loathsomeness in the Queen's 27 See, e.g., Sir Francis Walsingham's letter to Elizabeth on the occasion of the Anjou marriage negotiations, which he vehemently opposed: ''If you mean it, remember that by the delay your Highness useth therein, you lose the benefit of time which (if years considered) is not the least thing to be weighed. If you mean it not, then assure yourself, it is one of the worst remedies you can use, howsoever your majesty may conceive that it serveth your turn'' ( Majesty to consent thereto. . . . The loathsomeness to grant it is by reason of natural suspicion against a successor that hath right by law to succeed.
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Clearly, Cecil could understand Elizabeth's fears. In Sir John Harington's words, Elizabeth was convinced ''that if she should allow and permit men to examine, discuss, and publish whose was the best title after hers, some would be ready to affirm that title to be good afore her.'' 30 But Cecil could not be dissuaded from the main task: ''Corollary: the mean betwixt these is to determine effectually to marry, and if it succeed not, then proceed to discussion of the right of the successor.'' 31 This ambiguity-whether succession meant after her death, or immediately-continued to haunt Elizabeth throughout her reign, as we shall see.
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But conciliar determination to settle the succession immediately, along with their willingness to accept Elizabeth's queenship, itself waxed and waned, depending on several factors. First of these was their perception of Elizabeth's sincerity in making good her often-floated promise to marry. Privy councillors' correspondence about the various marriage negotiations circles endlessly around this crucial variable. 33 In the early years, the drive to settle the succession subsided at points when it appeared most plausible that Elizabeth might be ready to take the plunge. Then there was the separate but related perception of the likelihood of marriage producing issue. This factor became increasingly significant as Elizabeth aged. Without the prospect of issue, marriage of a queenwhether by a ''stranger'' or a peer of the realm-came to look uncomfortably like conquest of the crown and the realm. 34 Both of these factors bore directly on a third factor: conciliar perceptions of the relative strength of Mary's claims to the throne. It is no coincidence that William Cecil wrote his memorandum after Mary had signally strengthened her dynastic claims to a conjoined crown by producing a male heir, although 29 she simultaneously compromised them (in the eyes of convinced Protestants) by accomplishing this feat through marriage to a Catholic husband. Finally, there was the need to ensure that any successor by law would be one of the brethren, prepared to enact the role of godly prince of the English nation. Increasingly, the exigencies of preserving Protestantism in England militated against an exogamous succession, with the tribe defined in national as much as spiritual terms. The question left pending after Mary's return to Scotland-in a history that lies outside the scope of this article-was whether the Scots were or were not part of the tribe.
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Of course, Elizabeth did not marry. Of course, she was not deposed. Of course, a ''true heir'' came to the throne at her death, in the person of her cousin Mary's son, James VI of Scotland. But these verities should not blind us to the fact that during this period important elements of the political nation regarded themselves as confronting a double-bind situation, with no easy or certain way of securing that male Protestant succession for which William Cecil prayed. Their perception of the absolute necessity of male rule in these dangerous circumstances forced them to reinvent kingship. On the one hand, the struggle waged between the queen and her councillors over marriage and succession produced what Patrick Collinson has called a ''monarchical republic.'' That innovative conception of the body politic identified godly men as possessing civic capacity by virtue of their Protestant commitment and (the factor that Collinson leaves out) their manhood. 36 But it was completed by, and the integrity of the body politic preserved by, a parallel abstraction. The monarchical republic devolved virility and martial competence, which were qualities deemed necessary to the enactment of godly rule, to a king figure: a zealous Protestant noble warrior, loyal to the queen through caste identity and personal bonds, affiliated to her godly councillors through spiritual affinity and national identity, and ruling, in tandem with both, in the service of the English imperial crown and international Protestantism. In the monarchical republic, two men played the role of king figure: first, Robert Dudley, from 1564 earl of Leicester; later, after Leicester's death, his political heir, the earl of Essex.
The concept of a king figure as a solution to the problem of inadequate monarchs was first adumbrated in the reign of the minor Edward VI, developing in tandem with the career of Protestant reformation in England. It proposed a native godly man who would enact the role of king until a true king, a male figure in whom pure royal blood and virtue combined, occupied the throne. In one form, the king figure achieved its apotheosis during Oliver Cromwell's protectorate. At that point, commonwealth and monarchical identities fused in a man who wielded the sword in order to preserve British Protestantism and simultaneously advance the second coming. For a moment, the perceived imminence of Christ's kingship absolutely overrode the claims to political consequence of royal blood. Earlier, the identity was sustained by various interpenetrating sources of legitimation. In Elizabeth's reign, the king figure might be regarded as nearly a king already. On the basis of blood, zeal, and virility, men like the earl of Moray or, in England, the duke of Norfolk would qualify, needing only some tinkering behind the scenes, including marriage to one of the two queens, to become a king. But he would also qualify for this status on the basis of his own ''virtue'': a quality denoted by his noble lineage, but attested to above all by his manifest refusal to take it on himself to be king in his own person rather than acting as God's officer. In England, over the course of Elizabeth's reign, the criteria changed decisively, in ways that signaled a move from blood to election. We can date this to 1572, when the duke of Norfolk was executed on the disputable ground that he had aspired to marry the Scottish queen, not in order to forward Protestant reformation in the conjoined isles, but rather in order to himself become king. 37 In the context of two queens in one isle, marriage to either queen of a Protestant noble warrior who 37 possessed his own blood claims to the crown proved too dangerous a prospect to countenance. In the monarchical republic, the role of king figure was therefore played by Leicester (and later Essex) not primarily because of their blood status but because they enjoyed the English queen's favor and, equally necessary, conciliar confidence in their rectitude. Finally, in Elizabeth's reign, the king figure acted in partnership with godly men in council to serve and constrain the queen, in a relationship predicated on their equality as brothers in Christ. The Elizabethan polity, it turns out, was, in important ways, both regnum Cecilianum and ''Leicester's Commonwealth.'' Hostile contemporary polemic was more acute, more pointed, than modern historians have been prepared to recognize. 38 Now let us turn to the politics of marriage and succession in the first two decades of Elizabeth's reign. Examining this terrain in the cultural context that I have outlined will allow us to track the changing bases of Elizabeth's claims to legitimacy as a female ruler over those years and the gradual articulation of the monarchical republic as I have described it. I will begin by investigating the negotiations for Elizabeth's marriage to a prince of Scotland in the period before the return of Mary Queen of Scots from France extinguished the hope of creating a Scottish king of Britain. I will then examine the succession proposals advanced in England in the early 1560s, when doubts about the continuance of Scotland's career as a godly nation and co-partner of the British empire put a premium on a ''mere English,'' or endogamous, masculine succession. I will conclude by considering the case of Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, as king figure in the Elizabethan polity. * * * In 1559, there was nothing new about the project of an AngloScottish alliance designed to secure Protestant reformation on both ideological and pragmatic grounds and to be confirmed through a royal marriage. What was new was the historical context of this endeavor. In the 1540s, Henry VIII had attempted to match his son Edward VI with the infant Mary Queen of Scots. 39 In Edward VI's reign, Protector Somerset continued the commitment to a marriage between these two principals. He advanced the same proposals that had been floated in Henry VIII's reign, with more explicit emphasis on fulfilling God's purpose for the whole isle and backed with the threat of war in the event that the Scots misread their providential history. 40 But very soon, as Knox recounted, God's ''hot displeasure'' was visited on the island, and reformation went into reverse. Mary Queen of Scots was sent to marry in France, leaving her French Catholic mother to take power as regent in 1554. ' 
41 Then, providentially, Britain was given a second chance, and in both realms. In England, Mary Tudor's unexpected death left the throne to her Protestant half-sister, Elizabeth, and political power to a coterie of committed Protestant advisers, very often men returning to offices and roles that they had occupied because of their religious convictions, and political ability, in the reign of Edward VI. In Scotland, only a few months later, ''The Faithful Congregation of Jesus Christ in Scotland,'' better known as the Lords of the Congregation, deprived Mary of Guise of the office of regent. This was an outcome eagerly anticipated by, among others, Elizabeth's chief councillor, William Cecil. 42 She was replaced by a select committee of leading Lords of the Congregation, including, in key positions, both of Elizabeth's aspiring bridegrooms: Lord James Hamilton, third earl of Arran, and Lord James Stewart, from 1562 the earl of Moray.
Against this ideological backcloth, the Scottish marriages proposed for Elizabeth in 1559 and 1560 are particularly interesting, not least because both were viable options, although historians customarily focus solely on the proposed match with the earl of Arran. This was the moment at which it looked as though God's plan to secure a Protestant Britain was naturally on the point of fulfillment. The threat posed to Britain by the accession of Francis II to the French throne could prove 40 an opportunity in disguise, if godly men in both kingdoms kept their nerve. Mary's new status as French queen, her geographical distance from Scotland, and the death of her mother in June 1560 made it likely that she would accede to the coup that had brought the Lords of the Congregation to power, allowing them the exercise of their militant Protestantism in her and her husband's name, in a kingdom that she evidently regarded as both foreign and barbarous. 43 Her health was not good. Her successor, should she die or should the crown pass out of her keeping, would be a young Protestant male, either the earl of Arran or her illegitimate half-brother James Stewart (legitimated in 1551); throughout these years, rumors abounded about their interest in and claims to the crown of Scotland. The English queen was a young, unmarried woman who must be found a Protestant husband. This concatenation of circumstances could actually buttress the case, as it seemingly did for William Cecil, in correspondence with Knox, that God might choose to ''transfer'' rule of Scotland from Mary to a godly successor king (and ''Scotsman in blood'') if Mary proved unable or unwilling to safeguard British Protestant interests against French claims.
44 Perhaps unanimity on this point influenced the language in which the Lords of the Congregation couched their initial proposal for marriage between Elizabeth and Arran. With supreme ambiguity, they offered ''him who being in the place of a king shall bring with him the friendship and force of a kingdom. '' 45 And how close was the earl of Arran to being king of Scotland? For English privy councillors, quite close indeed, having a slight edge, which was based on the conventional dynastic propriety of his claim to the throne, over his competitor for the queen's hand, Lord James Stewart. Both men were to be offered to Elizabeth, to see which might secure her favor, presumably on the understanding that either could function as a British king, depending on their commitment to the cause. Cecil In November, Thomas Randolph confirmed to Sir Ralph Sadler and Croft that the Lord James and Arran were the ''finest of all the Protestants in Scotland. '' 46 Both men's qualifications, in the eyes of English privy councillors, quite evidently owed as much to their determination to possess the Scottish crown as to their demonstrable Protestantism. 47 In August, Sadler, the English ambassador to Scotland, was instructed to find out if rumors that Lord James had designs on the crown were true. He was to be ''encouraged'' in this project if the Hamilton interest continued to be, as it was for the moment, ''cold'' in its pursuit. Potentially king of Scotland; through marriage, he could become king of England as well. In June of the following year, Cecil, in Edinburgh for the treaty negotiations, wrote to Elizabeth on two separate occasions to talk up the Lord James's claims when Elizabeth, much to his annoyance, refused to go along with the proposed marriage to the earl of Arran. He was ''not unlike either in person or qualities to be a king's son,'' Cecil informed her on 1 June. By 19 June, he had upped the ante: the ''Lord James [was] not unlike to be a king soon.
[He] hopes God will direct her to take choice of a husband. '' 48 In these early years, Elizabeth's legitimacy thus hinged, implicitly but immediately, on her willingness to marry, preferably a Scottish pretender to a British crown. Once Mary's return to Scotland closed off this alternative, English men of affairs turned their attention to the possibility of transforming their own queen into the shape of a king. The reintroduction of Catholicism into Scotland at the level of the crown put a premium on protecting the English imperial crown and safeguarding Protestantism in the whole isle. These were national necessities that, in the early 1560s, in the eyes of committed Protestants, now required a ''mere English'' Protestant warrior king. As the Scottish option collapsed, councillors began to explore the potential of manipulating conceptions of dynastic succession to achieve this outcome. The impetus for this turn was strengthened by Elizabeth's refusal to marry, combined with fears about 46 England's inferior status in any marriage to a foreign king because ''England'' was figured by a queen. 49 The cogitation of the councillors bore fruit in proposals designed to identify this potential king: the man who would be called to the throne either in succession to Elizabeth, in the event of her death without male issue, or, the radical option, immediately. These proposals called into question the legitimacy of the Tudor royal line. They did so in order to disallow the status of Mary Queen of Scots as next legitimate successor in the Tudor line and simultaneously privilege male Protestant virtue as a criterion for kingship. They thus threatened Elizabeth's tenure of the throne not only because of her status as a single childless woman but also because her claims, like those of Mary Stewart, were rooted in possession of Tudor blood.
In the early 1560s, succession proposals centered on two main candidates: Henry Hastings, ''the Puritan Earl'' of Huntingdon, and Lady Catherine Grey, the impediment of her sex, partly, but not wholly, counterbalanced by her pedigree and her marital status. 50 In addition to his sex and noble status, Huntingdon offered staunch Protestant conviction combined with a double descent from Edward III. His sex was as important as these other credentials. In September 1560, the Spanish ambassador noted that ''the cry is that they do not want any more women rulers, and this woman [Elizabeth] Later, he stated that Cecil alleged that Huntingdon was the true successor to the crown on the grounds that Henry VII had usurped the realm from the House of York. If Cecil did indeed float this idea-one that challenged Elizabeth's legitimacy just as much as Mary's, and, by disallowing Tudor royal status, threatened to reopen the scars left by the Wars of the Roses-it dramatically illustrates both of the risks he was willing to run to ensure England's Protestant future, and his dynastic terms of reference. By March 1561, the Spanish ambassador Alvarez de Quadra was convinced that Elizabeth would name Hastings as her successor. Would this be as successor-or incumbent? Huntingdon certainly feared that he was at the mercy of a movement that would attempt the latter. He wrote a letter to Leicester that can be read in no other way: 49 See, e.g., the astrological prophecy cast by Sir Thomas Smith in the early 1560s and heavily annotated by Cecil. This identifies a successful outcome as contingent on Elizabeth's prospective foreign husband dying first-although, of course, not without first having produced issue. Strype, Annals, vol. How far I have been always from conceiting any greatness of myself, nay how ready I have been always to shun applauses both by my continual low sail and my carriage, I do assure myself, is best known to your Lordship, and the rest of my nearest friends; if not, mine own conscience shall best clear me from any such folly. Alas! . . . Will a whole commonwealth . . . forsake a Prince, both for excellent qualities, and rare virtues of nature, and of great hopes of an inestimable blessing by her princely issue, in reason of her youth, for a poor subject in years, and without any great hope of issue? No, no: I cannot be persuaded they would, if I should be so foolishly wicked to desire it, or that my mind were so ambitiously inclined. I hope her Majesty will be persuaded of better things in me, and cast this conceit behind her.
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Lady Catherine Grey, like Huntingdon, possessed the requisite traits of Protestant zeal and distinguished Protestant lineage; she was the sister of the martyred Protestant queen Jane Grey. Nor did her sex entirely invalidate her claim, although undoubtedly it weakened it. For Lady Catherine, unlike Elizabeth, was married. Moreover, she was married to a man of impeccable pedigree, martial and spiritual, Edward Seymour, earl of Hertford. Hertford was the son of Lord Protector Somerset, the man who had preserved England's imperial crown and Protestantism during Edward VI's reign. Still more important to the men who supported her involuntary candidacy, in this instance, godly union had produced good fruit, and less equivocally than had been the case with Henry VIII's union with Jane Seymour. In 1561, the first of Catherine and Edward's two sons was born. Was it coincidence that Cecil changed horses at this point and began to argue for the legitimacy of Catherine's claims to the throne? The Spanish ambassador may have got hold of the wrong end of the stick-but he may not have-when he alleged that Cecil planned to imprison other claimants to the throne in the event of Elizabeth's death and pass the crown suddenly to Lady Catherine. Significantly, de Quadra believed that he would take this step less because of Grey's personal claims than because ''London [was] so much in favor of the Earl of Hertford on the ground of religion.'' 53 Subsumed in her noble, virile Protestant husband, both brought up in a milieu where ideological purity outweighed constitutional nicety and herself demonstrably fertile, Catherine Grey's candidacy was strong enough to make Elizabeth weep with rage when it was floated by powerful figures among her chief advisors, including, at various points, Cecil, the earl of Arundel, and the duke of Norfolk. 54 Grey's instrumental status is also indicated by the fact that Hertford and his sons continued to be regarded as leading claimants to the crown long after her death. 55 Moreover, in this case, too, as with Huntingdon, a revisionist interpretation of England's past provided the basis for securing a Protestant future, this time by reassessing the Grey-Hertford claim to the imperial crown in preference to Elizabeth's. The first step was taken in 1559, in a memorial written by the militant Protestant Sir Henry Sidney, Philip Sidney's uncle and future privy councillor. According to Sidney's account, Elizabeth's councillors ''discovered'' evidence that disloyal bishops had engaged in unlawful practices during Edward VI's reign, with Mary Tudor's connivance, to advance the Catholic religion in England. The evidence was contained in letters and papers that had remained in Mary's chest at her death: ''Which closet, upon her decease, (as is customary), was sealed up by order of her privy council, for the use of her present Majesty, her successor.'' Had these projects been discovered during King Edward's days, Sidney concludes, ''it was thought it would have hindered Queen Mary's reign. For when [the incriminating documents] were read at council, those privy councillors who were instrumental for her coming to the crown before the Lady Jane Grey, were much amazed, having never heard of these things til now. '' 56 In 1559, this memorial obviously served two different purposes. On the one hand, it attempted to secure the bishops' compliance with the new regime by reminding them of its moderate character. They might, the subtext implies, have faced a ''thorough'' religious settlement that would threaten their estate, or face such in the future, should their intransigence align them with the disloyal bishops of Edward VI's reign. On the other hand, and arguably of more significance for political life during Elizabeth's reign, the memorial enhanced Jane Grey's claim to the throne. It implied that both women enjoyed nearly equal claims to the throne, Grey's godliness presumably nearly counterbalancing the blood advantage enjoyed by known, it would have tipped the scales and assured Grey's elevation to the crown. She would have been, not possibly next in line to the throne after Henry VIII's daughters (depending on how one regarded the claims of Mary Queen of Scots and the status that one accorded to Henry's last will), but rather the agreed successor to Edward VI, on the grounds articulated in the 1553 ''Device for the Succession'' that led to her nineday rule. 57 And, at this point, we must remember that Jane Grey was advanced to the crown after her marriage to the son of England's Protector, the duke of Northumberland, but before the devoutly anticipated Protestant male heir arrived, only because of the unexpectedly rapid deterioration in Edward VI's physical condition.
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The quest for a king thus brought the Edwardian regime's constitutionally innovative attempt to secure a male Protestant succession through a Dudley-Grey marriage back into political prominence, dragging the hapless Lady Catherine Grey in its wake and implying a short tenure of the throne for Elizabeth. For the arguments advanced to promote Protestantism at the expense of direct blood inheritance also privileged male rule over female with single-minded intensity. 59 According to Edward VI's Letters Patent, written to prepare the ground for the ''Device,'' both Mary and Elizabeth were illegitimate, their mothers having been divorced by the king. But they were also excluded from succession on the grounds that, if they inherited, they might marry ''strangers born out of the realm, who would then subvert true religion and replace English laws with those of his [sic] country.'' 60 Again, we see the significance of the fact that both Grey sisters were married to, hence subsumed in and constrained by, noble English Protestant males when their claims to the throne were under consideration. And the crown was to descend to them only as an instrumental measure, on its way to a king. This point was, understandably, made even more forcefully in the proclamation that announced Lady Jane Grey's accession to the throne, as England's first female ruler, than it had been in Edward VI's original Letters Patent: 60 See ''Edward's Letters Patent for the Limitation of the Crown,'' in Mortimer Levine, Tudor Dynastic Problems, pp. 167-68. Notably, the letters stress that both Elizabeth and Mary ''be unto us but of the half blood'' and therefore could not inherit, even if they had been legitimate (which he claimed they were not).
[In the event of Edward VI dying without issue his state] should remain, come and be unto the eldest son of the body of the said Lady Frances [daughter of Henry VIII's younger sister and Jane and Catherine's mother] . . . and to the heirs male of the body of the same eldest son lawfully begotten, and so from son to son . . . and, for default of such sons born in the world, in his [Edward's] lifetime, of the body of the said lady Frances lawfully begotten, and, for lack of heirs male of every son lawfully begotten, that then the said imperial crown . . . should remain, come, and be to us . . . and to the heirs male of our body lawfully begotten.
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Elizabeth regarded Catherine's candidacy with real alarm. As soon as her marriage to the earl of Hertford was discovered in 1561, it was declared illegal on the grounds that there had been no witnesses. Both parties were imprisoned. Edward was released from the Tower soon after. Catherine, more dangerous in her motherhood, yet more vulnerable because of her sex, languished there as she awaited the birth of their child. In 1562, Elizabeth managed to have the marriage officially declared invalid, and, hence, the elder of the two sons, at least, bastardized.
62 But that was not the end of it, not with the Scottish queen back in her native land, the Scottish marriage plan aborted, and international Protestantism in the balance. In 1564, John Hales, whose radical Protestantism had been forged in company with William Cecil during the Edwardian experiment in government, was in disgrace with the queen for acting, seemingly on behalf of the Privy Council, to disallow the claims of Mary Queen of Scots to the crown. He wrote a book, timed to coincide with the 1563 Parliament, which followed the genealogy proposed by the ''Device'' that would make Lady Catherine Grey the rightful heir. Hales followed up the offense by seeking legal advice ''from beyond the seas'' to prove the legitimacy of her marriage. This was an infringement of the royal will that (not surprisingly) ''offended the queen very much.'' 63 In 1565, it became apparent that Mary planned to strengthen her claim to the English throne through marriage. Her suitor was her cousin, the Catholic Henry Stewart, Lord Darnley, himself possessor of a plausible ''mere English'' claim through descent from Henry VIII's elder sister 61 See ''The Proclamation of Lady Jane Gray's Title to the Crown,'' in Gilbert Burnet, The History of the Reformation of the Church of England, 3 vols. (London, 1679), 2:241. I deliberately leave Matilda out of account, as her example proved too disputable during the sixteenth century to serve as a reliable historical precedent for female rule. 62 Cecil told Throckmorton that ''nobody can appear privy to the marriage, nor to the love, but maids, or women going for maidens,'' because the ''Queen's Majesty thinketh . . . that some greater drift was in this'' than simply a love match-telling evidence, incidentally, for early modern gender hierarchies. Miscellaneous State Papers, 1:177. 63 Strype, Annals, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 117, 121.
Margaret. Cecil, in despair, proposed some precautionary measures that would counter the Scottish queen's enhanced blood entitlement: a new drive against Catholicism and ''some relaxation of the queen's displeasure towards Lady Catherine Grey.'' 64 The first, which was soon to become so characteristic of Elizabethan politics, duly took place; the second, so threatening to Elizabeth's queenship, encountered her obdurate refusal. * * * During this second phase, then, Elizabeth's best claim to rule stemmed from weaknesses in the claims of the proposed alternatives. These included Grey's sex, the prospect of renewed civil war that accompanied Huntingdon's claims, and, of course, the fear among the political elite that losing their existing queen, for whatever reason, might culminate in a horribly accurate replay of Mary Tudor's accession in 1553 on the basis of blood right, this time with Mary Queen of Scots in the role of rightful queen. As we have seen, Elizabeth tried to maintain her advantage by putting obstacles in the paths of these two near competitors. She kept Huntingdon impoverished and at a distance from his home territory (and the court); she imprisoned Grey and bastardized her children. 65 And, as is well known, she tried to forbid discussion on the two vital issues of marriage and succession-lest, I would argue, those debates lead to a resolution that invalidated her queenship.
At this juncture, however, a negative strategy carried its own considerable risks. Failure to renegotiate the relationship between blood and kingly status left the default position of blood inheritance intact, and with it the Scottish queen's status as Elizabeth's legitimate successor. Although this position may have been acceptable to the English political nation as a whole-as it was very evidently Elizabeth's preference-it was and remained utterly unacceptable to her zealous Protestant councillors. 66 Their fears of Mary's accession as a consequence of Elizabeth's (in)action and the resulting tensions between the queen and her councillors forced her to respond to the succession crisis brought about by her refusal to marry.
In 1562, on the occasion of her near-fatal attack of smallpox, she 64 CSP Foreign, 7:384-87, 385, 387. 65 Huntingdon's candidacy was weakened, too, by his own equivocal virility. He and his wife were childless, and his next youngest brother, George, inclined to Catholicism (Cross, The Puritan Earl, p. 105). Further evidence for the dynamic I am exploring comes from the 1582 conspiracy against Elizabeth that was mounted in Ireland. For the conspiracy, see Strype, Annals, vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 203-4. 66 For her continuing attempts to effect this outcome see, e.g., CSP Scottish, 2:844, 867. put forward her own candidate for the succession, Robert Dudley. Dudley was the brother of Lady Jane Grey's husband, now restored to noble status as Elizabeth's favorite suitor and Master of the Horse. Apparently on her deathbed, Elizabeth begged her councillors to make him protector of the realm in the event of her death, with an income of £20,000 a year. Although she loved him dearly, she said, she swore that ''as God was her witness, nothing unproper had ever passed between them.'' 67 Inevitably, given the ideological context that I have described, privy councillors began, once the queen recovered, seriously to consider Dudley not only as candidate for her hand but also as potential king. It is important to bear in mind that Dudley already had experience of both roles, in a context that we would be unwise to dismiss as mere playacting. Dudley had been chosen to rule the Christmas kingdom of the Inner Temple revels in 1561. The Templars used this occasion to urge Elizabeth to settle the succession and to present Dudley as the pattern of the perfect Protestant prince. Gorboduc, their play, and the even more evocative marriage masque that depicted Dudley as Prince Pallaphilos, were printed and reprinted throughout Elizabeth's reign (even after Dudley's death), respectively, in 1565, 1570, and 1590, and in 1562, 1568, 1572, 1591, and 1597. 68 Elizabeth's nomination inaugurated Dudley's career as king figure in the Elizabethan monarchical republic. He joined the Privy Council in October 1562, was ennobled as the earl of Leicester in 1564, and developed the role of warrior in God's cause at the level of the crown that was later to be assumed, with tragic results, by his stepson and political heir, Robert Devereux, earl of Essex. As early as the summer of 1563, according to Wallace MacCaffrey, ''something like a balance'' had been struck between Leicester and Elizabeth's councillors, including the man so often erroneously depicted as Leicester's bitter rival, William Cecil. 69 At his death in 1588, a patent was being prepared that would grant Leicester the unheard-of office of Queen's Lieutenant in the Government of England and Ireland. 70 Why did Elizabeth make this extraordinary move? Dudley was Protestant, yes, but his blood had been tainted by treason in the recent past, in part because of his father's attempt to elevate his son Guilford to the status of king through marriage to a queen. 71 Moreover, because it was read by contemporaries as sexual, Dudley's personal relationship with the queen itself challenged her standing, as we have seen in the Spanish ambassador's remarks. And what could she have meant? In 1562, reference to a Protector would have conjured up images of ''good dukes'' who had exercised supreme power in order to preserve the realm in circumstances of monarchical incapacity. As recently as 1559, this interpretation had been brought into the political mainstream, and given a forceful Calvinist slant, with the publication of the Mirror for Magistrates.
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Why would she propose an alternative model of governance-one with such positive resonances-as the solution to a succession crisis that her councillors regarded as being entirely of her own making? Obviously, we shall never fully plumb the nature of the relationship between Elizabeth and Dudley that has so intrigued generations of students of Elizabeth's reign. No less a historian than J. E. Neale concluded that she had momentarily lost her political bearings. The request represented ''an instinctive desire'' that surfaced in her illness due to her ''confused, uncritical state of mind.'' 73 But several points are worth bearing in mind when we consider the timing of Elizabeth's interjection. First, she made it after she had concluded that she would not marry Dudley, although her decision was not generally known. 74 Second, during the medical crisis, rumors flew throughout London that Dudley, in his martial capacity as Elizabeth's Master of Horse, had a large armed force under his control and was poised to declare for Huntingdon as king. 75 These rumors persisted even after Elizabeth's return to health, her brush with death mercilessly highlighting her single, childless status. (In the parliament summoned in its wake, Alexander Nowell, Dean of St. Paul's, told the queen that as Mary I's marriage had been ''a terrible plague to all England . . . so now for want of your marriage and issue is like to prove as great a plague.'') 76 And it was at this time that Cecil began to consider the possibility of resolving the succession crisis through recourse to a conciliar regency, with power to choose the next sovereign vested in it and parliament. Did Elizabeth propose Dudley to counter this two-fold threat? Dudley and Huntingdon were related through family ties, as brothers-in-law, as well as being, through spiritual affinity, brothers in Christ. The same affinal relationship bound Dudley to Grey, through his brother's marriage to her sister, Lady Jane Grey, in Edward VI's reign. 77 Did Elizabeth gamble that the strength of her and Dudley's ''natural'' affinity would attach him to her cause? Did she seek to defuse the threat of Cecil's ''constitutional'' solution by attaching a popular variant to Dudley in terms that simultaneously presented him as the man most likely to father a legitimate Protestant male heir of her blood through marriage? In this succession game, did he serve her needs precisely because his equivocal status made his candidacy, for her hand and for a commanding political role, almost impossibly difficult for her councillors to accept?
Whatever her reasons may have been, Dudley's promotion certainly strengthened Elizabeth's position as queen in her own right. Her stated commitment to Dudley as the official claimant to her hand, reaffirmed at intervals over the succeeding two decades, gave Elizabeth maneuvering room-the space of that ''almost''-during her childbearing years. It allowed her to pursue, with remarkable tenacity and success, her primary political goal of securing unchallenged possession of the English crown. She also attempted (ultimately unsuccessfully) to preserve the political authority of her sister queen, Mary Queen of Scots, including her right to inherit the English crown after her own death. This policy became increasingly difficult but, from Elizabeth's point of view, even more necessary once Mary proved her fertility by producing a male heir, the future James I of England, in 1566.
Perhaps the best evidence for this interpretation can be seen in Elizabeth's attempt to use Leicester to forward these related goals. In the 1560s, English and Scottish councillors sought to marry the Scottish queen to a godly English peer of the realm, a plan known as the ''marriage to England.'' ''England'' here figures as the noble Protestant man near enough to kingly status to become king through marriage to Scotland's queen: the English analogue to the proposed marriage of Elizabeth to a prince of Scotland in 1559. This endeavor ran parallel to the English succession proposals discussed above. Like them, it aimed to neutralize Mary's political authority, by promoting virility and godliness above blood claims, and it similarly threatened Elizabeth's own warrant to be queen. Her response, between 1563 and 1565, was to insist that the candi- date be none other than her own ''suitor,'' Robert Dudley. 78 Elizabeth's offer of Leicester to her sister queen appeared to show her support for the ''marriage to England'' so doggedly pursued by her councillors, but, in reality, scuppered it. Even after his ennoblement as the earl of Leicester, the Scots would not accept Dudley as a marriage candidate because, as Kirkcaldy of Grange told Thomas Randolph, he was not from a ''great old house,'' and because ''his blood [was] . . . once spotted.'' 79 Here we see how Elizabeth could use Leicester's equivocal noble status-on the one hand, England's premier noble in his relationship to the queen; on the other, a ''new man'' of tainted blood-to strengthen her own position as queen. Given Elizabeth's desire to maintain Mary as a credible successor to her crown while seeing off her direct claim, insisting on an impossible match had the additional advantage of keeping Mary in the same condition of disputable legitimacy as herself, unmarried and childless. 80 In England, throughout the 1560s, the Dudley option was contested, debated, and agonized over by councillors and leading men of affairs. It was difficult because it changed the terms of the debate over marriage and kingship in two ways. Unless and until Dudley married the queen, he had no blood claim to the crown that would elevate him above his peers; quite the contrary. As a consequence, his status, current and future, depended entirely on the queen's favor, read as the likelihood of their marriage. In the early years, Dudley's unique position thus threatened the prospect of an election in which the queen cast, if not the only vote, quite likely the deciding one, according to her own will and pleasure. Over these years, however, Leicester won his spurs through his demonstrable commitment to Protestantism, thereby effecting his transformation from exclusively the queen's favorite to king figure in the monarchical republic. He proved his loyalty to the queen, to her councillors, and to international Protestantism. He also proved to be sufficiently disinterested in his exercise of political power to satisfy both parties-the queen and her councillors-that he would not take it upon himself to be king. On this reading, Leicester's long-lasting, almost laughably inconclusive courtship of Elizabeth represented not relentless self-promotion but rather his unflagging commitment to the role. Leicester, as God's officer, stood in place of a king by virtue of a personal relationship with (if not marriage to) England's queen and his godly and collegial relations with fellow Protestant councillors of state. For Elizabeth's councillors, too, the Dudley option came to carry substantial advantages. It allowed a way out of the intractable conundrum that confronted men who wanted to preserve political order, the Tudor line (with, if possible, Elizabeth as queen), and the True Church, and who, in the 1560s, had feared that these were fundamentally incompatible outcomes. Leicester as king figure allowed them to trust to God and commit to their queen, deferring radical political action to secure a Protestant male heir, if need be, until the point of her death without issue. In his martial capacity, Leicester could ease the succession by protecting the country from anticipated foreign invasion at a vulnerable time. He also stood prepared, in the last resort, to be ''seized'' by the English crown, unless and until a true king could be identified and agreed on. The advantages of this political arrangement became more apparent over time, as the courtship maneuvers became ever more symbolic. Leicester's Protestant commitment and his intimate relationship with the queen came to represent the next-best alternative to her subsumption in a Protestant British king through marriage. And as long as Leicester monopolized the queen's natural body in this (symbolic) way, it meant there was no scope for an alternative claimant for her hand or for the crown, one who might not understand, or who might choose to ignore, the rules of the gamepossibly at the behest of the queen.
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The arrangement also allowed Elizabeth's councillors to use Leicester to put pressure on the queen to forward their godly agenda. When they were at loggerheads, at pressure points in the reign, the queen's authority could stop her councillors from insisting, in her presence, on measures that she feared or disliked. But, according to the conventions that governed her and Leicester's relationship, she could not-indeed would not-want to prevent Leicester, her approved lover and second self, from expressing his convictions, which happened also to be those of her councillors. We can see evidence of this dynamic in a 1587 letter that Leicester wrote to William Cecil (now Lord Burghley) in the fraught months following the execution of Mary Queen of Scots. Elizabeth's anger on this occasion was fearsome to behold, and was directed specifically at her councillors. 82 But councillors could not pursue the path of discretion at this juncture. able advice concerning the necessity for a militant Protestant advance to preserve the brethren in the Netherlands. They could, however, use Leicester to finesse the situation, in a strategy that he felt utterly undermined his hard-won claims to conciliar rectitude. He wrote to Burghley to complain about his treatment at the hands of his fellow councillors, and Burghley in particular:
I know not for whence my hap hath it, but it hath fallen out sundry times, both contrary to my expectations, (and much less by any desert of mine), that I have found your lordship more ready to thwart and cross my endeavours than any other man's; especially in the presence of her majesty, and for such causes as I have been the more earnest in, when by your lordship's own allowance and opinion, it had been so resolved on by our conference before, as fit and meet advices to be given her majesty, for the best furtherance of her own services [especially regarding the Low Countries].
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Assured of conciliar unanimity and support-Leicester hoped to be ''assisted and comforted'' by its expression in conferences with Elizabeth that they prepared for in advance-he could not understand why it failed to materialize in the council chamber. Instead he found himself alone in advancing the conciliar line that had been ''before . . . debated and agreed upon.'' What was this, he asked in anguished tones, ''but to leave me, in her majesty's opinion, to be a man either affectionate, or opiniative in mine own conceits [?]'' 84 In fact it was a ploy designed to persuade the queen to accept her councillors' agenda as her own, in terms that made her acceptance of their advice a function, not of their combined virility and virtue, but of her (queenly) favor. 85 Take another vignette, again related to the Netherlands. In 1586, Leicester accepted the governor-generalship of the Netherlands with the approval of his fellow councillors and against the queen's express command. In the face of the queen's towering rage, her councillors reacted much as we might expect. Sir Thomas Heneage, deputed to relay the queen's response to Leicester, volunteered, on his own responsibility, to tone down Elizabeth's sentiments lest her fury derail the cause. Burghley offered the queen his resignation, not the enactment of her will.
86 Leicester, in the Netherlands, cast around for a means to symbolically express how it was that he served both God and the queen to a court of European opinion but even more importantly to the queen herself. He found it in a piece of theater enacted on at least one occasion, when he knighted a Dutch gentleman in honor of his commitment to this holy cause. In Utrecht, William Seagar tells us, ''[Leicester's] court was a fair and large house . . . in which was a very great hall, richly hung with tapestry.'' At the upper end of this hall, ''was a most sumptuous cloth and chair of estate for the Queen's Majesty with her arms and styles thereon, and before it a table covered with all things so requisite, as if in person she had been there.'' (By contrast, ''on the left hand, almost at the table's end, was my Lord's trencher and stool, for he would have no chair.'') It was in this space, before ''the state of her Majesty,'' with ''all degrees assembled,'' that Leicester used his sword to increase ''the number of [God's] saints,'' against Elizabeth's will, and on her behalf. 87 * * * Over the first two decades of Elizabeth's reign, then, the desire to unite England and Scotland in the person of a Protestant king forced men to recast the grounds of monarchical legitimacy. They renegotiated traditional assumptions about marriage and dynastic succession, articulating blood to virility in ways that promoted the role of election-ambiguously of God and the male political nation-in the constitution of a king. As a result, the early years of Elizabeth's reign witnessed a range of marriage and succession schemes regarding both queens. These were predicated on the assumption that marriage of one or both queens to a Scottish or English Protestant near-king was the most desirable, but not the only, means of securing the male Protestant succession deemed necessary to preserve the True Church, from Rome and from the threat posed by female rule. All reworked existing traditions of dynastic inheritance to widen the pool of potential candidates: men who could claim to be king, either in their own right or through marriage to one or the other queen. In all these options, conviction Protestantism constituted a powerful source of legitimacy and claim, or strengthened and legitimated a claim, to which male identity was vital, whether immediately or instrumentally.
In conclusion, I want to review the four options to secure a godly king in the 1560s that I have considered. First, Elizabeth's councillors proposed her marriage to a Scottish noble with blood claims to the Scottish crown, either James Stewart, the future earl of Moray, or James Hamilton, third earl of Arran. Mary's return to Scotland, and the consequent collapse of the Scottish option, put a premium on renegotiating conceptions of blood inheritance in terms that would promote the entitlement of a ''mere English'' candidate. This renegotiation threw into relief the claims of two contenders, the earl of Huntingdon and Lady Catherine Grey. The Grey option proposed Elizabeth's replacement as queen by a Protestant claimant whose blood claims to the crown were, in this context, validated by her marriage to a Protestant male of similar standing and by her status as the mother of sons (virility married to fertility). The Huntingdon option, still couched in dynastic terms, proposed the immediate accession of a Protestant male to the English throne on the grounds of his superior entitlement as scion of the House of York. It is important to remember that these proposals were advanced when Elizabeth's tenure of the throne was uniquely weakened by three factors: her failure to marry, Mary's assumption of political power in Scotland, and Elizabeth's near death from smallpox in 1562.
The Grey and Huntingdon options had manifest drawbacks, not least because they hinged, in the last resort, on men's willingness to act on new conceptions of blood entitlement by deposing their current ruler. At this point, Elizabeth changed the rules of the game. She put forward a fourth option, one that brought Robert Dudley forward as potential successor, as well as potential husband. The Dudley option, refined in terms that abstracted both claims over the next decades, stabilized Elizabeth's queenship and promoted the articulation of the monarchical republic. It did so by providing a king figure to compensate for the perceived deficiencies of female rule, at many points symbolically, at others (especially in relation to military affairs) actually. This level of abstraction in the understanding of kingly identity reflected a growing willingness on the part of the political nation to regard Elizabeth, and not Mary-the antithesis is important-as satisfactorily, if mystically, ''married'' to, and hence constrained by, her godly Protestant male subjects. 88 The resulting political arrangement was never unproblematic. It broke down entirely in the concluding years of Elizabeth's reign when the combination of a very aged queen, a hot-headed youthful king-figure in the person of the earl of Essex, and a polarized political climate made it unsustainable.
